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Abstract. This article is an attempt to comprehend the bureaucratic phenomenon of the
deathwatch, the last 24 hours of a prisoner’s life, stressing the theoretical applications
scholars can make to the study of docile bodies on death row. Because years of work are
necessary to obtain obedience from condemned inmates, health care professionals lend
more than an aura of legitimacy to the capital punishment process. As an integral part
of the prison and capital punishment, they provide stability, reliability, and the means to
achieve the goals of peaceful executions. The ultimate objective of utilizing health care
professionals is the sanitization of penal practice and penal language to effect the
complete absence of resistance from the condemned.
If they were to come to my cell and tell me I was going to be executed
tomorrow, I would feel relieved, in a way. The waiting would be
over. I would know what to expect. To me, the dying part is easy; it’s
the waiting and not knowing that’s hard....I have reached the point
where I no longer really care....They are killing me a little bit each
day (Johnson 1998: 198).
Petitioner could long ago have ended his ‘‘anxieties and uncertain-
ties’’ [about serving 27 years on death row] by submitting to what
the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve: execution (Foster
v. Florida 2002).
Introduction
This article is an attempt to comprehend the bureaucratic phenomenon
of the deathwatch, the last 24 hours of a prisoner’s life, stressing the
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theoretical applications scholars can make to the study of docile bodies
on death row. The purpose of this article to analyze prisoners’ last days
and hours on death row through the lens of time control. In particular,
we describe how health care professionals are directly involved in the
governance of captive prisoners awaiting death through a form of
pacification known as pastoral power. In other words, our aim is to
avoid a history of capital punishment and instead uncover the micro-
political and ‘‘capillary’’ management techniques of everyday life for
prisoners both on death row and on the deathwatch.
Although there is some benefit in relying on class analyses to discuss
the movement to execute indoors, we prefer to study the execution
protocol from the standpoint of an analysis of power and technique
through the lens of time control, which we hope will lead to a better
understanding of how disciplinary power not only represses bodies but
produces knowledge about imprisoned bodies. Time on death row as a
bureaucratic phenomenon is under theorized in capital punishment
studies. Yet it is important to stress that lengthy delays on death row are
more than just inconveniences; time delays serve the state’s need to tame
resistance. They are an aid to the smooth administration of justice for
prison administrators. The United States’ execution protocol is an at-
tempt by prison authorities and staff to target captive bodies for com-
plete docility long before they are executed (Johnson 1998; Federman
and Holmes 2000; Holmes and Federman 2003).
The Condemned Body as a Political Surface
For Michel Foucault, the problem of population control was the central
problem of government during the Enlightenment, as rulers sought less
direct means to govern growing populations than through overt dem-
onstrations of pain and punishment. Foucault locates the movement
from unconcealed sovereignty to disciplinary administrative techniques
within a shift in language as well as a change in institutional structures.
These discursive and institutional alterations were more than just
adjustments in tactics that began in the 17th century. ‘‘At stake is the
biological existence of a population’’ (Foucault 1990: 137). How, then,
to justify state-sanctioned death, if life is to be preserved and sanctified?
The new justification for state-sanctioned death rests on the con-
struction of a kind of person who represents a biological danger to
society (Curran and Graille 1997). This threat is located directly within
the criminal’s body and emanates from his behavior, which the Supreme
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Court categorizes in capital punishment cases as ‘‘heinous, atrocious,
and cruel’’ (McGautha v. California 1971; Bell v. Cone 2002). Foucault
suggests that this turn toward the criminal, his body, and his danger-
ousness was designed to get potentially unwilling populations to do
what the government wanted through a process of normalization and
classification of kinds of persons, behaviors, and diseases. What’s cre-
ated out of this disciplinary mix, Foucault argues, is a docile, willing
person, ‘‘an inapt body’’ (Foucault 1995: 135).
Once the body becomes a target for power, Foucault looks to the
construction of a discourse that can be used to make the body compliant.
Borrowing from pre-Enlightenment religious imagery and language,
Foucault defines pastoral power as a form of power that requires a person
to serve as a guide for another. The guide is a person of moral influence,
who exercises a discreet power over his or her listeners. In its more
modern guise, pastoral power replaces the care of the self with a regard
for others. Inside the prison, the figure of the captive and the health care
worker take the place of the shepard and the flock, a change in repre-
sentation complete with state-sanctioned police powers capable of
altering the practices of the self (Cichon 1992;Kansas v.Hendricks 1997).
For Foucault, power is not above but operates within a discourse of rule.
Pastoral power ‘‘implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to
direct it’’ (Foucault 1982: 214). In part an internalization of control, it is
also an attempt to ‘‘outsource’’ control to non-governmental subjects
(Garland 2001: chap. 7), thereby denying the government any direct
supervisory role over prisoners.
An emphasis on pastoral power in prisons points not to the Whiggish
ideal of reform-minded institutions that are well intentioned, but to the
strategic necessity of disciplining bodies with bureaucratic regulations in
order to pacify prisoners for death. With this more nuanced under-
standing of power and governance, yet one rooted in European history
and thought, it is difficult to see the prison solely as ‘‘bureaucratic and
disciplinary by default, having betrayed its mission of human self-
realization to a repressive State or a rapacious economy’’ (Hunter 1996:
149). Rather, the effects of pastoral power on prisoners and
the administration of capital punishment means that we take seriously
the role of scientific and bureaucratic discourses that are built into the
administration of imprisonment generally and capital punishment in
particular. The management of prisoners and the just measures of pain
create a language of care that has as its object the formation of a
hierarchy and a distance between the governors (who wear medical
clothing) and the governed. ‘‘The early Christian pastorate provides us
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with an image of the exercise of power that is in many ways continuous
with certain of our present forms of expertise’’ (Dean 1999: 75). These
forms of expertise not only include but rely on the ‘‘psy’’ disciplines such
as nursing, social work, and psychology (Rose and Miller 1992), all of
which are active in prisons. These disciplines, because they are scientific
and rational, and because they rely on trust based on pedigree and
status, help achieve the normalization and pacification of captive indi-
viduals and populations (Holmes 2002; Holmes and Gastaldo 2002).
Because years of work are necessary to obtain obedience from
condemned inmates, health care professionals lend more than an aura
of legitimacy to the capital punishment process. Private physicians who
treat prisoners in state-run prisons, as the Supreme Court held in West
v. Atkins (1988), are state agents, subject to constitutional requirements
and restrictions. But more than seeing health care professionals working
in prisons as adjuncts to a penal apparatus dedicated to reform, we view
health care professionals as serving the function of a modern-day pas-
torate, guiding, pushing, and pacifying dangerous prisoners to ready
themselves for death (Campbell v. Wood 1994). As an integral part of
the prison and the execution of capital punishment throughout the 20th
century, health care professionals provide stability, reliability, and the
means to achieve the goals of a peaceful death (Vaughn and Smith 1999;
Lifton 2000). One important objective in utilizing health care profes-
sionals in prison settings is the ‘‘sanitization of penal practice and penal
language’’ (Garland 1990: 235) to effect the complete absence of
resistance from the condemned.
How, then, is this process of docility rendered, particularly as overt
forms of punishment are no longer practiced in western penitentiaries?
Encasing executions within the walls of a prison does more than just
protect middle-class society from its sanctions; it renders bodies docile
through a process of temporal regulation. We believe that pastoral
power and a discursive notion of time, taken together, serve to mortify
the captive subjects held within prisons. The regulation of death
through time management creates a new language of punishment and
obedience. It masks the violence of state-sanctioned punishment by the
employment of health care professionals and through scientific and legal
discourses that redirect our attention away from the prisoner’s pain and
toward punishment (Francis v. Resweber 1947; Cover 1986; Provenzano
v. Moore 1999).
The American reformer Benjamin Rush recognized as early as 1787
that public punishments had no edifying purpose on spectators. Indeed,
he thought that public executions provided a space for the criminal to
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become infamous, to take advantage of the variety of bodily signals that
being in public provides. Public executions, Rush wrote, ‘‘destroys in
[the convicted] the sense of shame’’ (Rush 1988: 80). Rush saw that
public executions were signs with unstable, multifarious meanings,
which no government could control. As Gatrell writes in The Hanging
Tree (1994: 34), regarding public executions, ‘‘Self-parody and the dis-
play of courage was one way of dealing with terror. Defiance was
another.’’ Just as the condemned is able to fashion his death as heroic by
appearing brave in front of the guillotine, or by crying out his inno-
cence, the crowd at an execution is free to interpret the condemned’s
posture as virtue, honor, and strength. Public executions liberate the
crowd from state-imposed understandings of guilt and punishment. As
he stands on the scaffold, the crowd can understand the prisoner in
positive terms, and see the state’s action as pusillanimous, vengeful, and
wicked. Move punishment inside, Rush thought, because anarchy of
interpretation is just as dangerous as anarchism. But the movement
indoors was more than a reaction to crowd behavior. It set off a process
of what Goffman calls ‘‘the mortification of the self’’ (Goffman 1961:
21) that is carried out by the nurse, the needle, and time itself. ‘‘To kill
felons without ceremony and in private was to deny them the only
worldly support they could hope for in their last hours’’ (Gatrell 1994:
37).
Rather than a single, unifying signifier, punishment in practice has
always presented itself as open to interpretation. ‘‘The art of punishing,
then, must rest on a whole technology of representation’’ (Foucault
1995: 104). For Rush and the early modern penologists, punishment
must be understood without any reference to the condemned’s behavior,
words, or gestures. The infinite meanings of punishment must be pared
down, isolated, made whole, explainable, and imposed by governing
elites not the public, forcing on the middle and lower classes the
understanding that the state not only does not kill in public, it does not
kill -- murderers, that is, those who kill in ‘‘wantonly vile’’ and ‘‘inhu-
man’’ ways do (Godfrey v. Georgia 1980: 426). Modern state-sanctioned
punishment and death is designed to appear seamless, as though the
state was merely transcribing society’s wishes into public policy. More
than just representing a change in venues, punishing the criminal
indoors signifies a discursive shift in the methodology of punishment.
The movement to execute indoors not only denied prisoners the
adulation of crowds, it furthered the bureaucratization and medical-
ization of execution procedures. Indoor executions are, by design,
bureaucratic and medical phenomena that disperse power throughout
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the penal system. But the movement indoors did not end resistance; it
reduced its occurrence. Why isn’t there more resistance? ‘‘Where there is
power, there is resistance’’ (Foucault 1990: 95). If power provokes
resistance, then we would expect to see resistance on death row. Instead
we find the opposite. Resistance, of course, can take multiple forms,
such as habeas corpus petitions from death row that allege constitu-
tional violations, or pressure from outside interest groups (Amnesty
2000a; Mumia 2000; Mexico v. U.S. 2003), both of which highlight
unconstitutional conditions on death row. But both of these forms of
resistance increase delays and greatly irritate the justices of the Supreme
Court, causing them to say: ‘‘It is incongruous to arm capital defendants
with an arsenal of ‘constitutional’ claims with which they may delay
their executions, and simultaneously to complain when executions are
inevitably delayed’’ (Knight v. Florida 1999). The effect of the Supreme
Court’s resistance to appeals means that resistance in Foucault’s sense
of a ‘‘radical rupture’’ has largely been thwarted. The Supreme Court
considers successive habeas filings ‘‘abuse of the writ,’’ and Congress
has strictly controlled the number of petitions death row inmates can file
(Rose v. Lundy 1982; Felker v. Turpin 1996; AEDPA 1996 sec.
2244(d)(1)); Schlanger 2003).
The intervention of medical personnel and technologies of power
into prisons has further served to limit resistance by increasing the
amount of respect and fear inmates have for prison authorities cloaked
in the garb of medical authority (Estelle v. Gamble 1976; Baum 2002). It
may be that the medicalization of death creates a deeper subjection
born, as Foucault says (1990: 202), ‘‘mechanically from a fictitious
relation. So that it is not necessary to use force to constrain the convict
to good behavior...the patient to the observation of the regulations’’
(Sim 1990; Hornblum 1999; Federman and Holmes 2000). Furthermore,
for resistance to be silenced, power must reach the very grain of the
condemned, rendering prisoners docile and obedient through the use of
time and the care of the soul. Far above laws and disciplinary tech-
nologies, power needs to operate in-depth by combining the use of time
as an instrument of control and the deployment of pastoral power to
those dependent on prison personnel.
Time in the Execution Protocol
Although time is not the ‘‘missing link’’ in the study of capital
punishment, we do mean to make it more central to death penalty
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studies. We concentrate on time because time has become the focus of
increasing disciplinary techniques within the prison and the deathwatch.
Our concern with time is larger than the problem that death row is an
increasingly long process of waiting to die. We are concerned with the
techniques rational state actors use to employ time, making it bear
down on the body of the condemned. As the United States Supreme
Court makes clear, death row is best understood as uninterrupted time,
useful time, and the expertise of time management is a prime element in
the governing of the soul or the shaping of the self (Rose 1990: 99;
Foster v. Florida 2002). Nothing happens in the federal government’s
execution protocol that is not bracketed by timeline headings. For
example, the protocol of the US Federal Bureau of Prisons begins with
the ‘‘Period of Time Between Establishment of an Execution Date to
30 Days Prior to the Execution’’ and ends with ‘‘Final Sequence of
Events: [a] Execution; [b] Countdown; [c] Execution’’ (BOP 2001: 5, 20--
21).
Before the advent of bureaucratic prison systems, executions used to
take place before the hour of sunrise, forcing prison officials to keep
exact records of the sun’s journey, everyday tracking precisely its rise
and fall. Under these naturalistic conditions, in the event of a stay or a
delay, prison officials would reschedule the execution for another day,
but always prior to the last 60 minutes that preceded the sun’s ascen-
dancy, thereby maintaining the unity of time. Today, most executions in
the US occur at a set time, usually after midnight, but sometimes in the
early morning or late evening, and prison officials rely on more exact
and artful regulations of time.
Although there are numerous procedural reasons for time delays on
death row, the everlasting time on death row is not accidental. More
than the give and take of prisoners asserting claims and the courts
rejecting them, we believe time serves strategic and disciplinary pur-
poses. While it is true that prisoners participate in delaying their exe-
cutions through habeas corpus appeals, these appeals are far from the
only reason for delay. Indeed, the success rate of prisoners’ habeas
appeals, about 40% (Liebman et al. 2000), demonstrates that prisoners’
appeals are justified, and cannot be looked at solely as delaying tactics.
But even if they were significant means to postpone execution, we would
still see these appeals as forms of resistance to state injustices, such as
the poor quality of capital attorneys and the refusal of states to provide
financial support for indigent defendants, both of which equally con-
tribute to delay (Flynn 1997; Aarons 1998). Our emphasis on death row
as a way to produce knowledge about captive bodies leads us, rather, to
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view time spent on death row as productive in a specific sense. It is a
positive disciplinary activity fostered by the state that permits increasing
knowledge about captive and condemned bodies while, at the same
time, assuring the penetration of penal power in order to mortify and
mollify the captives.
In the context of deathwatch, time is a heuristic device linked with
disciplinary discourse, productive and evolutionary because it insures
the breakdown of bodies into pieces before real death occurs. Time on
death row promotes docile behaviors on the part of condemned inmates
through a sequence of activities marking the condemned’s journey from
imprisonment to execution. We see the emphasis on time as a discursive
trope that allows the American deathwork to reach its ultimate
objective: the elimination of resistance.
Consequently, breaks in the process are less important than the
overall march to execution, although the government allows that some
interruptions are more legitimate than others. The US Bureau of Pris-
ons guidelines state that (2001: 46): ‘‘It is the policy of the BOP that:
procedures must be in place to receive and ensure proper handling of
legal interruptions of the execution countdown.’’ Presidential com-
mands that come from the Constitution are acceptable; the continual
filing of habeas corpus appeals is not. The temporal procedures put in
place mean that a delay no longer forces a rescheduling of the execution
to another day, before the hour of sunrise. In effect, BOP regulations
silence the prisoner, assessing the value of his appeal a lower order in the
chain of command that governs his captivity. Extensive regulations and
the subsequent actions of the penal-medical staff govern the deathwatch
and destroy the subject, to be sure by execution, but also by denying
him a voice in his final hours. As Scarry writes (1985: 18):
In torture, it is in part the obsessive display of agency that permits
one person’s body to be translated into another person’s voice, that
allows real human pain to be converted into a regime’s fiction of
power.
The state’s complete appropriation of time has as its central meaning
the intention to create a unified language about power in government, in
things that are manipulatable, in the disciplining and breaking of bodies
by circuits of time. In a word, among those who are captive.
The federal Bureau of Prisons Execution Protocol divides delays for
execution into three temporal categories: lengthy, short, and indefinite
(BOP 2001: 48). Unity of time is maintained, despite the discontinuity
caused by the interests of outside actors, some of whom prevent the BOP
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from inflicting its notion of time on the inmate. Consequently, each
temporal category stands alone and has its own regulations and proce-
dures. ‘‘If the delay is relatively short in duration,’’ the regulations state,
the witnesses will remain in place. The drapes [to the execution
chamber] will be closed and the condemned individual will remain
restrained on the table. If the delay is either lengthy or indefinite, the
execution is halted, and either the witnesses are returned to the
staging areas in the order listed, where the witnesses will await fur-
ther information, or the condemned individual [is] returned to
appropriate quarters in the institution (BOP 2001: 48).
As the law bears down on delays, on the prisoner’s final moments, it
brushes up closer against the body of the condemned. The carceral
regime focuses exclusively on a life readied for death.
Bio-Power and Penal Technologies
Bio-power, or power over life, a term coined by Foucault (1990),
emerged in the 17th century in response to a rapid demographic
expansion throughout Europe. This power evolved following two dis-
tinct dimensions that merged together, while remaining distinct, in the
19th century. The articulation of these two poles, anatomo-politics and
bio-politics, did not follow forms of randomly organized practices.
Instead, these practices took on the appearance of concrete forms of
power, because the control of the social body through life demands a
pre-determined set of strategies and tactics. For example, as suggested
by Gastaldo (1997), confession techniques, as well as therapeutic
practices of health care professionals, constitute an efficient method to
link ‘‘the micro-physics to the macro-physics of power’’ because they
connect the individual, or patient, to society or the general population.
Bio-power is a subtle and organized method of governing while using a
variety of power techniques.
The first pole of bio-power arose during the 17th century and focused
on the body as a machine that can be rendered docile, conformed, and
useful. Bio-power is a productive form of power able to ‘‘optimize,
administer, and multiply life, subjecting it to precise controls and
comprehensive regulation’’ (Rabinow 1984: 259). Bio-power is
a power that [is] bent on generating forces, making them grow and
ordering them, rather than [a form of power] dedicated to impeding
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them, making them submit, or destroying them (Rabinow 1984:
259).
Bio-power constitutes a stage in modernity’s development toward the
regulatory control over bodies, centered on the power over life. Power
‘‘would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the
ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it
would be able to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level
of life itself’’ (Foucault 1990: 142--143). Gastaldo (1997: 115) adds that
‘‘the control of the social body through life demands a whole new set of
strategies.’’
Power over life is situated bureaucratically within prisons and the
deathwatch. How is this power organized? BOP protocol states: ‘‘Not
all of the persons involved need to practice together’’ (2001: 9). ‘‘Indi-
vidual teams will practice as units, with inter-team practices scheduled,
as necessary by the Warden, to facilitate coordination and smooth
interaction.’’ A republican, seemingly egalitarian, form of government is
firmly in place during the deathwatch, yet one that accommodates
hierarchy and whose sole concern is the regulation of a captive popu-
lation, the smooth administration of death to the convicted. The
assembly-line approach to death management in American prisons is a
supervisory technique for the mortification of prisoners. The intended
beneficiaries are doctors, nurses, and bureaucrats who bear the burden
of bringing the inmate to the death chamber.
Treating time as a social and discursive construct directs our gaze to
the intent and purpose of the execution protocol: the need to discipline
bodies at the final moment of a prisoner’s life by parceling out regula-
tions into discrete zones designed to simplify the bureaucratic com-
mands regarding the movement from life to death. These regulations,
furthermore, by partitioning the responsibility throughout the prison
establishment, can ease the ethical or religious difficulties health care
professionals and prison guards might encounter in carrying out
executions (BOP 2001: 7).
The Body in Time
No longer gazing at the trajectory of the sun, moon, and other celestial
bodies for guidance, prison officials direct their attention to the move-
ment of bodies inside the prison. But resistance has been tempered. The
full force of power is modulated, dispersed, and buried within the penal
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technology of time management. Temporal penal technologies serve as
communication routes and support mechanisms ‘‘for the power and
knowledge relations that invest human bodies and subjugate them by
turning them into objects of knowledge’’ (Foucault 1995: 28). The
movement from a natural occurrence of time’s changes (the sun’s as-
cent) to the government’s declaration that time determines the moment
death occurs likewise marks a change in people’s attitudes toward
authority and authority’s attitude toward the body. It reveals the
emergence of a shift in the way government governs persons and things,
from a government that governs under natural principles of justice to a
government that constitutes itself by its own rationality, including its
own understanding of time. The modern prison creates a ‘‘triangle,
sovereignty-discipline-government’’ (Foucault 1991: 102) that is con-
stituted by time and pastoral power, a merging of structure and agency
that mitigates resistance. What are the implications for the deathwatch?
At a minimum, the shift to a recognized time for death (and pre-
cautions for delays) means that the state has seized time not just from
the sun or nature, but from prison guardians, the media, crowds,
death penalty opponents, as well as condemned prisoners. To be sure,
scheduling death for an unknown time may provoke fear in an inmate,
and therefore may be more terrifying and torturous (and even satisfying
for the vengeful), but scheduling death for a more or less exact moment
gives the state greater control over events, crowds, media, and the
condemned, without diminishing the element of torture (Johnson 1998:
chap. 6; Racine-Welch and Welch 2000). Verdery (1996: 53) writes that
‘‘temporality can be deeply implicated in definitions and redefinitions of
the self, as selves become defined or redefined in part through temporal
patterns that mark them as persons of a particular kind.’’ The seizure of
time shapes the meaning of capital punishment by defining its purpose
in language. The temporal flow of the punitive discourse provides an
institutional framework for increased control over the inmate’s body as
well as a circuitry for manipulating the prisoner’s message. It objectifies
the subject, time and space, and denies that the structuring of time to
serve the state’s ends is evidence of ‘‘lost time,’’ or of a fragmentation of
the self, and, as a consequence, prevents resistance on the part of the
condemned. Focusing on time within penological discourse is an at-
tempt to understand how contingent authority structures in civil society
influence the reorganization of power within prisons.
The BOP regulations allow prisoners strapped to a gurney and
readied for execution only a ‘‘reasonably brief’’ final statement. The
regulations deny prisoners a voice in their own death. The incarcerated
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body is subject only to the state’s definition of time and its use. In the
state of Florida, the average time on death row for persons who have
been executed is 11.79 years, which is determined from the affirmance
of the death sentence to the date of execution (Florida Department of
Corrections). Between 1977, 1 year after executions resumed in the US,
and 1997, ‘‘the average elapsed time on death row was 111 months
from the last sentencing date’’ to execution (Knight v. Florida 1999:
460). Although Amnesty International believes that this is ‘‘cruel,
inhuman, and degrading,’’ the US Supreme Court does not (Amnesty
2000b). The problem of wasted time for death row inmates has no
constitutional foundations, hence no language by which to rebut
charges of cruel or unconstitutional treatment. And so, after years of
immobility and waiting on death row, the time before execution
accelerates. Time, which previously had no meaning to the prisoner
because the state does not give meaning to death row (it is a period
between two things, sentence and judgment) now has a material reality
and a durative element, but not for the condemned. The state calls this
the deathwatch.
The Regulation of the Condemned
In 1974, Willie Lee Richmond was convicted of robbery and first-
degree murder (State v. Richmond 1983). The judge sentenced him to
death, and he stayed there for 12 years. When he filed a writ of
habeas corpus in federal court, contesting his 12-year confinement as
a form of cruel and unusual punishment, the federal court rejected
his claim and held that Richmond had made good use of his time on
death row. Richmond, the federal court wrote, no longer used drugs
and had undergone a religious conversion. Overall, his time on death
row had been well spent, representing (to the court) a justification for
the length, unity and sovereignty of prison time. Any interruptions in
his execution timetable were his own, the court insisted, and therefore
illegitimate, because they came in the form of fruitless legal chal-
lenges contesting alleged judicial improprieties. The court of appeals
upheld the district court’s dismissal of Richmond’s eighth
amendment’s claims.
More recently, Clarence Lackey took his case to the United States
Supreme Court to contest his time on death row as an Eighth
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Amendment violation (State v. Lackey 1982, 1989; Lackey v. Scott
1995a, b; Lackey v. Texas 1995). Lackey served 17 years on death row
before being executed on May 20, 1997. The Supreme Court refused to
hear Lackey’s Eighth Amendment claim, but Justice John Paul Stevens
declared, in a memorandum attached to the Court’s denial of a writ of
certiorari, that Lackey’s claim was novel, and that there were
‘‘dehumanizing’’ and psychologically torturous aspects to prolonged
exposure to death row. The Supreme Court similarly dismissed a
petition for hearing in Elledge v. Florida (1998), a case in which the
prisoner had served 23 years on death row.
Judicial seizures of a prisoner’s time have one aim: to further break
down the individual’s resistance to prison authority by further
breaking down the subject. This mortification process takes time,
knowledge, techniques and expertise. It requires the appropriation of
medical technology and medical personnel (Campbell v. Wood 1994).
Rather than promoting the ‘‘cultivation of the self,’’ time spent on
death row actively denies it. Appeals, the Supreme Court has held, are
forms of ‘‘abuse,’’ and wasteful of ‘‘valuable resources,’’ such as
judicial time. Time on death row, then, serves a purpose; it is needed
to get the prisoner to break down, to confess, to turn inward, to get
religion, to contemplate his past and future, but not to petition for
relief. Alone in his cell, prison forces the inmate to subject himself to
objectification and observation within a carceral regime built to out-
last the incarcerated body of the prisoner. More important, captive
bodies become sites of inspection, where health care professionals and
prison guards seek to discover the ‘‘truth’’ about inmates (Rhodes
2004: 142). Prison settings create fields of multiple forms of knowl-
edge about life and death, illness and health, deviance and normality.
The prisoner’s body presupposes a whole network of powers that bear
down upon it, building it up only to break it down. Consequently,
control is achieved without fetters. Johnson (1998: 143) writes that
under most execution protocols, prisoners are not chained by the
hands and feet as they go their death: the appearance of freedom
means that ‘‘the condemned prisoner must be under the social, not
physical, control of his keepers.’’ This is the field of ‘‘bio-politics’’ and
‘‘anatomo-politics,’’ the administration of life over bodies and popu-
lations that relies not only on the sovereign display of power but on
the circuitry of power: a micro-politics of everyday life during the
death row period.
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The Execution Process
When Execution Order is Received
As soon as the execution order is received, the condemned inmate is
moved into a special security area of the prison. Based on hourly checks,
staff document his/her behavior and bring anything unusual to the
warden’s attention.
Pre-Execution Reports
Two reports are prepared within 3 weeks of the established execution
date. The first is 20 days before execution; the second is 7 days before
execution. Each report includes:
• Psychiatric report -- Results and interpretation of examinations,
interviews and history of the inmate by three psychiatrists which will
be used to determine the inmate’s sanity.
• Chaplain report -- Comments on the inmate’s spiritual and emotional
well-being.
• Summary of behavior -- Observations noted by case worker, nurses
and custody staff.
• Cover letter from warden -- Includes firsthand information from
interviews, observations or communication with the inmate and his/
her family or friends.The 7-day pre-execution report discusses any
changes that have occurred since the first report.
Sanity Review Requests
Within 30 to 7 days before the execution, the inmate’s attorney may
submit current psychiatric information that may have a bearing on the
sanity of the condemned inmate. This information will be provided to
the panel of psychiatrists to consider in completion of the pre-execution
psychiatric reports.
Last 24 Hours
During the day before the execution, the warden will make special
arrangements for visits by approved family members, spiritual advisors,
and friends.
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About 6 p.m. the day before the execution, the inmate will be moved
to the death watch cell which is adjacent to the execution chamber.
From then on, a three-member staff unit will provide a constant death
watch.
Soon after he is rehoused, the inmate will be served his last dinner
meal. The prison makes every effort to provide the meal requested by
the inmate.
Between 7 and 10 p.m., the assigned state chaplain and the warden
may visit the inmate. The inmate may read, watch television, or play the
radio. He can request special food items and coffee or soft drinks.
The family, spiritual advisors and friends the inmate has selected as
witnesses may arrive up to 2 hours before the scheduled execution.
About 30 minutes before the scheduled execution, the inmate is given
a new pair of denim trousers and blue work shirt to wear. He is escorted
into the execution chamber a few minutes before the appointed time and
is strapped onto a table.
The inmate is connected to a cardiac monitor which is connected to a
printer outside the execution chamber. An IV is started in two usable
veins and a flow of normal saline solution is administered at a slow rate.
[One line is held in reserve in case of a blockage or malfunction in the
other.] The door is closed. The warden issues the execution order.
The Execution
In advance of the execution, syringes containing the following are
prepared:
• 5.0 g of sodium pentothal in 20--25 cc of diluent
• 50 cc of pancuronium bromide
• 50 cc of potassium chloride
Each chemical is lethal in the amounts administered.
At the warden’s signal, sodium pentothal is administered, then the
line is flushed with sterile normal saline solution. This is followed by
pancuronium bromide, a saline flush, and finally, potassium chloride.
As required by the California Penal Code, a physician is present to
declare when death occurs.
After all witnesses have left, the body is removed. Typically, the
family claims the body.
If not, the State makes the arrangements (California DOC). How is it
possible for the condemned not to resist? What forms of power are
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responsible for such docility to occur? Why is the fiction of power so
powerful?
Conclusion
The deathwatch is a highly controlled event; a contemporary ritual of
death in American prisons, supervised by health care professionals. ‘‘We
record everything, missing nothing. If he turns over in his bed, we note
it. How much he eats, how much coffee he drinks, how many cigarettes
he smokes -- we record it all’’ (Johnson 1998: 144). The discursive ele-
ments of the execution protocol frame the body as a site of observation.
This is a ‘‘strategy without a strategist’’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:
258); the federal government’s execution protocol is a book without an
author and title. The author-less and title-less execution protocol of the
United States federal government deploys various ways, broken into
segments, in which the body is prepared for death by numerous un-
named actors and through multiple and invisible forms of power (psy-
chiatric nursing care, for example). The protocol creates a cluster of
discrete relationships, all of which focus exclusively on the body of the
prisoner and the goal of bringing him to death.
Foucault’s focus on bio-power helps explain the way of normalizing
the prison’s supervisory functions. The law fades from view and regu-
lations take over. ‘‘The current position in Illinois law is that doctors
can participate in executions contrary to state, national and interna-
tional medical ethics, [and] are protected by law from being identified
and disciplined by professional associations, and are declared to be non-
doctors for the purposes of the Illinois Medical Practice Act whenever
they assist in executions’’ (Amnesty 1998: 13; Breach of Trust 1994).
The laws in the 38 death penalty states deny that medical techniques
that are used in executing prisoners are medical techniques. They deny
that medical personnel who are used in executing prisoners are medical
personnel for the purposes of executing prisoners (Federman and
Holmes 2000). These laws shield the behavior of health care profes-
sionals from punishment by denying their involvement. In a formal
sense, these laws and regulations remove the possibility of resistance
from the health care professionals who administer the drugs to the
condemned by covering up their involvement. The prisoner simply dies,
without the aid of state agents or health care professionals, who are
excised from legal responsibility, and without the use of illegal lethal
drugs, which are considered legal only for the purpose of execution. As
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the Florida Department of Corrections makes clear: the executioner is
‘‘a private citizen who is paid $150 per execution. State law allows for
his or her identity to remain anonymous’’ (Florida DOC).
The organization of death in the US prison system is founded on
various knowledge-based discourses -- time, power, bodies, space,
resistance, life and death as well as on various forms of expertise
(criminological, medical, psychological, nursing). It is because so much
of the deathwatch is predicated on knowledge of the body in pain that
the superfluous display of control provokes no resistance. To prepare
prisoners for electrocution, for example, it is not necessary to shave the
entire head. But that is what is done. ‘‘The execution team recognizes
the dehumanization process, watches it unfold, and knowingly benefits
from it’’ (Johnson 1998: 202). As we have shown, this mortification
process is achieved in a number of ways, by employing health care
professionals to attend to death row inmates, and through the use of
time, an integral aspect of bio-power and prison.
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